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There are few people who like a sore loser, and judidal sore losers are perhaps 
more contemptible than most. One of the quirks of our legal system is that it 
gives litigants, but not judges whose decisions have been reversed by a higher 
court, certain rights of appeal. When litigants exercise those rights the matter is 
supposed to be dosed. When, however, a worthy academic journal gives a judge 
who has been reversed by the highest court in Canada the opportunity to criticize 
that Supreme Court he may be so foolish as to accept their invitation.
This paper is premised on the belief that public inquiries, even those dealing 
with the conduct or misconduct of individuals, have an important role to play in 
our sodety. This role is being eroded by the Supreme Courts’ insistence on 
safeguarding the rights of the individual at the expense of the public interest. By 
virtue of its decision in Starr v. Houlden,1 the Supreme Court has effectively and 
unnecessarily restricted the scope of provindal and federal inquiries into 
misconduct of provindal or federal affairs.
In Starr the Supreme Court set aside an Ontario Commission of Inquiry into 
the alleged wrong doing of Patrida Starr and a real estate and development 
corporation, Tridel. Inddentally, in dedaring the inquiry ultra vires the Supreme 
Court also overturned a unanimous Ontario Court of Appeal judgment upholding 
the validity of that inquiry. I was a member of the Court of Appeal panel that was 
reversed by the Supreme Court judgment — hence “the sore loser”. I was also a 
commissioner in two very noisy commissions in the early 1980s. One was a federal 
inquiry into a train wreck in Mississauga. The second was an inquiry into the 
mysterious infant deaths at the Hospital for Sick Children in Toronto. It is 
doubtful whether these inquiries would have survived a challenge if Starr had been 
the law at the time.
There were many cases before Starr that dealt with the validity of public 
inquiries using a division of powers analysis, and I reviewed these in a speech 
given at the Pitbaldo Lectures in Winnipeg.2 Almost invariably, a division of 
powers question arises when a public inquiry is established to look into alleged 
acts of misconduct. The inquiry is challenged on the grounds that it is infringing 
on the federal power over criminal law and procedure reserved to it under s.
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91(27) of the Constitution3 The most important of these cases, and the only one 
directly on point decided after the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms4 was 
O’Hara v. British Columbia.5 There, a prisoner was released after suffering 
serious injuries while in police custody. An inquiry under the British Columbia 
Police Act6 failed to identify the person responsible. The province then ordered 
its own inquiry charged to investigate the manner in which the prisoner was 
detained, discover the identity of the person or persons responsible for his injuries 
and determine if any evidence had been suppressed in the earlier investigation. 
The constitutionality of the commission was upheld after the inquiry was 
challenged by the police officers under suspicion.
In O’Hara, Dickson CJ. set out the limits placed on provincial and federal 
inquiries by the division of powers under the constitution, though he refrained 
from analyzing the effect of the Charter on the inquiry:
As stated, there are limits to a province’s jurisdiction to establish an inquiry and 
equip it with coercive investigatory authority. Broadly speaking, those limits are 
twofold in nature. First, a province may not interfere with federal interests in the 
enactment of and provision for a uniform system of criminal justice in the country 
as embodied in the Criminal Code. An inquiry enacted solely to determine 
criminal liability and to bypass the protection accorded to an accused by the 
Criminal Code would be ultra vires a province, being a matter relating to criminal 
law and criminal procedure. This limitation on provincial jurisdiction is an 
acknowledgement of the federal nature of our system of self-government. 
Secondly, neither a province nor Parliament may infringe the rights of Canadian 
citizens in establishing inquiries of this kind. This limitation is of a different sort.
It is an acknowledgement of a respect for individual rights and freedoms and is 
embodied in the common law, various acts of both levels of governments, including 
the Canada Evidence Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. E-10, and more recently, the Canadian 
Charter o f Rights and Freedoms. Thus, neither level of government may establish 
and insist upon procedures which infringe fundamental rights and freedoms, such 
as the right against self-incrimination as it is defined in our law. It will suffice to 
say that while the appellants framed their arguments in terms strongly reminiscent 
of a challenge to the constitutionality of the inquiry based on the latter set of 
concerns, this court was asked only to address its constitutionality in terms of the 
distribution of powers between the two levels of government. I therefore express 
no opinion upon the nature and extent of rights guaranteed by the Charter and the
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law of evidence as they relate Co the inquiry’s proceedings except to say that those 
rights, of course, must be respected by the relevant authorities.7
Three years later the Supreme Court was faced with another challenge to the 
validity of a public inquiry in Starr. Patricia Starr was the President of the Toronto 
chapter of the National Council of Jewish Women. Newspaper articles had 
accused her of making contributions out of the coffers of the charity to certain 
politicians, and had printed reports of her association, along with the National 
Counsel of Jewish Women’s association, with Tridel Corporation Inc., a real estate 
development corporation. During the time of the publication of these articles it 
was revealed that Gordon Ashworth, an assistant to the Premier of Ontario, had 
received a refrigerator and some painting work on his house provided by a Tridel- 
related company. This latter incident prompted Mr. Ashworth to resign and the 
Premier to establish the Inquiry. The Premier made the following statement 
laying out the terms of reference of the inquiry:
I have today ordered a judicial inquiry into the facts surrounding the relationships 
between Patricia Starr, any person or corporation she may have acted for, 
including Tridel, and any elected and appointed officials, including Gordon 
Ashworth.
The recent allegations are deeply disturbing and profoundly worrisome. I am very 
troubled by this situation and I think that it is essential that there be an immediate 
and independent public inquiry to get to the bottom of it. I am determined that 
in the carrying out of this inquiry, that no stone be left unturned, that every lead 
be followed up on, that every allegation be thoroughly and exhaustively 
investigated until all of the facts have been laid bare before us.
Nothing is more important than the public trust. I will do everything in my power 
to ensure that it is protected. I believe very strongly that the democratic system 
depends on the public’s trust and faith in the integrity of their public officials. 
People must be confident that public officials, all public officials, whether elected 
or appointed, are people of integrity. They must be confident that their officials 
are operating in an honest, impartial and objective manner free of prejudice, free 
of bias, and free of unwarranted partisanship. Most importantly, public officials 
must be open to public scrutiny, and in doing so must be found to be beyond 
reproach, and acting in accordance with the highest ethical standards. I am 
confident that this judicial inquiry will uncover those who have not functioned in 
this manner. I give you my personal assurance that those whose performance has 
been found wanting will be discovered, those who have erred will be punished, and 
those who have broken the law will be prosecuted.
The terms of reference required the Commissioner, without expressing any 
conclusion of law regarding the civil or criminal responsibility of any individual or 
organization, to inquire into dealings between Patricia Starr, Tridel or Tridel-
related companies and elected or unelected officials of the province. Its purpose 
was to determine if any benefits were conferred on officials of the province by Ms. 
Starr or Tridel. The phrasing used to describe the mandate of the inquiry was 
very similar to s. 121 of the Criminal Code concerning frauds on the government.8 
The validity of the inquiry was challenged on three main grounds:
(1) The inquiry was invalid because it related to criminal law which is within the 
exclusive jurisdiction of Parliament;
(2) the inquiry would inevitably infringe Charter rights; and,
(3) the Commissioner could not obey his mandate to inquire “without expressing 
any conclusion of law regarding the civil or criminal responsibility of any 
individual or organization,” something he was forbidden to do by the terms of 
reference.
The majority of the Supreme Court of Canada determined that the inquiry was 
a colourable transgression on the federal power over criminal law. The inquiry 
was, in effect, a substitute police investigation and preliminary inquiry. The 
majority reached this conclusion by examining the terms of reference or mandate 
given to the inquiry and the background facts of the case. The true purpose of the 
inquiry was the investigation and determination of facts relating to a specific 
criminal offence. Lamer J., in finding the inquiry ultra vires emphasized the fact 
that there was a criminal investigation underway concerning two individuals named 
in the inquiry. He also pointed out that the terms of reference of the inquiry 
incorporated for the most part s. 121 of the Criminal Code.
The following conclusions may be drawn from the majority judgment of the 
Supreme Court:
(1) If a court determines that a provincial inquiry is “pith and substance” an 
investigation into criminal matters, the inquiry will be ruled ultra vires;
(2) a conclusion that an inquiry is ultra vires is more likely if specific names and 
specific criminal offences are set out in the terms of reference of the inquiry; 
and,
(3) the Supreme Court of Canada has given notice in Starr that it is more likely 
today than in the past to conclude that an inquiry is pith and substance an 
inquiry into crime if the inquiry is looking into conduct that may result in 
criminal charges.
The rationale behind the majority judgment stems from the court’s increasing 
concern with the protection of individual rights. The majority judgment is 
peppered with statements expressing this concern. Nowhere in their judgment is 
reference made to the equal concern that governments should have the ability to
investigate conduct within its ranks or that the public has an interest in knowing 
of such misconduct.
In my opinion the dissenting judgment of Madam Justice L’Heureux-Dubé 
balances the rights of the individual and the public interest far more effectively. 
She accepted the judgment of the appeal court that the inquiry was, “in relation 
to a provincial matter namely the relationship between provincial government 
officials, both elected and non-elected and other named individuals and 
corporations; it relates to matters of undoubted provincial concern ... .” 
L’Heureux-Dubé J. further held that the inquiry fell within provincial jurisdiction 
set out in ss. 92(4), (7), (14) and (16).9 Moreover, the naming of individuals in 
the terms of reference served only to limit and focus the inquiry. The similarity 
between the terms and s. 121 of the Criminal Code was to delineate the scope of 
the circumscribed investigation wherein, by the terms of reference, criminal 
findings were expressly prohibited.
In examining the case-law, she noted that in the past numerous inquiries in 
Canada had dealt with specifically named persons being investigated for specific 
wrongdoing, and the Supreme Court had validated these inquiries. Traditionally, 
the court recognized that the purpose and effect of an inquiry were different from 
a judicial proceeding. In an inquiry there is no lis, no accused, no criminal 
consequences and no penalties involved. Although the terms of reference of an 
inquiry may be similar to that of the Criminal Code, the purpose of the terms of 
reference is quite different from that of the Criminal Code. She then concludes:
On the question of division of powers, I do not know of any general postulate 
which would restrict or impede provincial inquiries into matters that are otherwise 
explicitly within provincial jurisdiction. I do not believe that the combination of 
several factors, each of which is intra vires, can render an inquiry constitutionally 
infirm. It is unnecessary for the present purposes to probe more deeply into 
constitutional theory regarding provincial competence to investigate public officials 
for alleged improprieties. However, a legislative enactment must seek to 
accomplish objectives that lie beyond the boundaries of its jurisdictional limits 
before it can be stamped ultra vires. Given the context and the scope of this 
inquiry, the circumscribed language of the terms of reference, and the 
pronouncements of this court, particularly in Keable and O’Hara, I cannot find that 
the Order in Council at issue is intra vires the Province of Ontario.
This inquiry is, in my view, a legitimate exercise by the province of Ontario of its 
powers to investigate a purely provincial matter. At the end of the day, the 
irresistible conclusion is that this inquiry is not an inquiry solely into a specific 
crime committed by specific named persons such as to encroach upon the federal 
law power. Its wider function becomes apparent when assessed in the context of
its establishment, upon a careful examination o f the terms of reference, and in
light of this court’s decisions in similar cases.10
Although I wholeheartedly concur with L’Heureux-Dubé J.’s judgment, the fact 
remains that in the end it is a dissenting judgment, and therefore, not binding on 
us lesser mortals.
I might add as a footnote that following the courts decision in Starr the inquiry 
was immediately wound up. Ms. Starr was subsequently convicted of a criminal 
offence, sent to jail for a spell and has since written a book blaming everyone else 
but herself for her predicament. Though she may be right, I would have preferred 
to hear about her and the other alleged miscreants from the Commissioner of the 
inquiry.
I was of the view in Winnipeg in 1990 and am of that view today that Starr and 
O’Hara cannot live together. I concede that the terms of reference in Starr were 
inelegantly drawn, but surely the fundamental question is whether the inquiry’s 
pith and substance transgresses the federal law power over criminal law and 
procedure.
One has only to compare the nature of the inquiries in Starr and O’Hara to see 
the conflict between the two decisions. O’Hara, an inquiry into whether the police 
had mistreated a prisoner, is a far more colourable usurpation of the federal 
power over criminal law, whereas Starr is more an inquiry of provincial concern, 
that is, whether the president of a charity had illegally contributed to the election 
funds of Members of the Legislative Assembly and whether public officials had 
received benefits from developers. Yet O’Hara was upheld by the Supreme Court 
as a valid inquiry, while Starr was declared ultra vires. Clearly the Supreme Court 
has applied an inconsistent division of powers analysis in these two cases.
In both inquiries the commissioner was specifically forbidden by the terms of 
reference to express any conclusion of criminal responsibility. The Commissioner 
in Starr stated that he was well aware of that restriction and intended to abide by 
it. However, the Supreme Court did not give him the opportunity. Apparently, 
the majority of the Supreme Court of Canada thought the task would be too 
difficult, if not impossible.
Given the Supreme Court’s decision in Starr, courts will not wait for an inquiry 
to overstep its bounds before declaring it invalid. An inquiry that may reveal any 
evidence of specific crimes will have a short and precarious life. It will be stopped 
before it has a chance to transgress. I consider this an unfortunate consequence. 
Commissioners are not automatons who are incapable of exercising their discretion
to avoid such transgressions. Many of them can think for themselves and have a 
well-developed sense of justice.
This, then, is the future that awaits us. No counsel worth his salt will allow a 
question to be posed to his client at an inquiry that might reflect the commission 
of a criminal offence without challenging the whole proceeding in court. Indeed 
counsel may well proceed against the commissioner before his client is called. He 
may not always be successful but the time taken up will be intolerable. The 
besetting sin of com m issions, aside from their cost, is the time taken for their 
completion. The time will be infinitely extended if they are required to justify 
their conduct time and time again, yet Starr has opened the door for this 
possibility.
In Starr, as I have said, the majority found it unnecessary to deal with the 
Charter. However, this issue was dealt with very thoroughly by the Nova Scotia 
Court of Appeal in Phillips v. Nova Scotia.11 In Phillips a provincial inquiry had 
been established to inquire into the matter of a fatal explosion in the Westray 
Mine. The terms of reference of the inquiry required the Commissioner to 
investigate the “occurrence”, determine whether it was preventable and ascertain 
whether there was neglect or non-compliance with statutes or mismanagement in 
the twin*», itself leading to the disaster. Certain mine managers at Westray 
challenged the validity of the Commission on the grounds that it wias ultra vires as 
being an encroachment on criminal law and that it violated their rights under the 
Charter.
The trial judge accepted the first argument and declared the Order-in-Coundl 
setting up the C om m ission ultra vires. She therefore did not need to consider the 
Charter argument. The Court of Appeal disagreed with the trial judge’s decision 
on the first issue. It held that the dominant purpose of the inquiry was to lpok 
into the coal mining disaster and make recommendations to prevent its repetition. 
This purpose was clearly within the constitutional competence of the province. On 
the Charter issue the Court found that the rights of the mine managers under ss. 
7 and 11 were infringed because the managers could be compelled to testify 
concerning matters on which they might be found criminally liable. Accordingly, 
while the Court set aside the ultra vires order, they ordered a stay of the inquiry 
until all proceedings under the Nova Scotia Health Act12 and the Criminal Code 
had been disposed of.
Leave to appeal in Phillips has been granted by the Supreme Court of Canada 
giving the court the opportunity to revisit the issues addressed in Starr. I can only
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say that I regret the way the law seems to be going. I said at the beginning that 
the restrictions the courts have put upon commissions have been both effective and 
unnecessary. In balancing the interests of the individual against the public interest, 
the courts have decided squarely in favour of the individual to the extent of 
eliminating the public interest, all to protect and advance private rights considered 
to be in jeopardy.
What are those individual rights that are in such jeopardy? Today, anyone 
who is remotely suspected of anything that the inquiry might reveal has counsel 
to represent him or her, usually at the public’s expense. This is the case even 
though under all of the provincial inquiry acts, no finding can be made against a 
person without due notice to that person. It has long been established that no one 
accused of a crime can be compelled to testify at his trial or any other relevant 
proceeding. Even if the individual is only a witness at the inquiry, the Canada 
Evidence Act?3 provincial inquiry acts, and the Charter all prohibit the use of that 
evidence in any subsequent proceedings.
While there may be a slight possibility of derivative evidence being obtained 
from testimony that may be damaging, there is always a discretion vested in the 
commissioner to refuse the evidence if it will work unfairly to the witness. In the 
inquiry into the baby deaths at the Hospital for Sick Children I was concerned 
about forcing any witness to testify if he or she claimed it would incriminate or 
otherwise prejudice him or her. However, no such claim was ever made. I should 
like to add, very much tangentially, that contrary to popular belief no witnesses 
were subpoenaed and forced to testify at that Inquiry. Everyone appeared and 
testified willingly. The only subpoenas issued were at the request of witnesses 
whose employers required them, or for those who needed them for the purpose 
of having their travelling expenses reimbursed.
The Supreme Court of Canada has implied that it is more important that these 
individual rights that are already largely protected be given iron clad protection, 
than it is for the government to be able to investigate misconduct to satisfy the 
public interest. I respectfully disagree with this approach but, like a good soldier, 
I will concede that I am wrong, and at least for the present, that they are right. 
This disagreement on my behalf is not to say that I do not believe in civil rights. 
It is just that I do not believe that they are the only rights worth believing in and 
protecting, especially when individual rights are already substantially protected. 
As L’Heureux-Dubé, J. noted in Starr.
Recalling the limitations on the Commission’s powers and function, it is worth 
noting the many procedural protections awarded the appellants in the Public 
Inquiries Act and the Commissioner’s own rulings: standing at the inquiry; cross­
examination of witnesses; right to counsel; opportunity to call witnesses to 
introduce evidence; privileges available to witnesses in court, such as solicitor-client 
privilege; and the opportunity to move for in camera hearings. Parties with 
standing or limited standing are entitled to funding of their costs at legal aid rates. 
Again, it cannot be overemphasized that the Commissioner is precluded from 
expressing any opinions regarding civil or criminal liability, or from levying any 
sanctions against the named appellants or other individuals called upon to testify 
at the public inquiry.14
Hallett JA. for the Court of Appeal in Phillips gave earnest consideration to 
b alancing the rights of the public against those of the individual and resolved the 
issue by postponing the inquiry. This may ultimately be the solution favoured by 
the courts, but it cannot be totally satisfactory. Postponing an inquiry only serves 
to focus attention on the besetting sins of inquiries — time and cost. Every time 
an inquiry is postponed, more money and time is wasted. It also throws the hard 
work done by the inquiry into chaos and may ultimately destroy its usefulness.
I sometimes think bitterly that one of the underlying reasons for the Supreme 
Court’s position on public inquiries is that the judiciary does not trust 
com m issioners to do the right thing. This rationale is odd because generally it is 
judges who are appointed commissioners of inquiries. In my view, commissioners 
should be expected to behave like judges when faced with a threat to civil rights 
or a potential breach of the Charter. As I said earlier, the commissioners in Starr 
and in Phillips knew that they were restricted from expressing conclusions of 
crim inal responsibility, and intended to abide by that restriction. They were 
stopped by the courts before they could show how they were going to accomplish 
this. This, I fear, is the future that awaits us.
Though this may indeed sound like sour grapes over the Supreme Court of 
Canada’s reversal of the Ontario judge’s unanimous opinions in Starr, this article 
is more than an intemperate attack by a sore loser. It stems from a deeply held 
conviction that public inquiries can and do serve the public interest and have 
generally proved themselves to be valuable additions to government and sources 
of comfort and knowledge to the public. They are very difficult to conduct and I 
cannot understand why the courts want to burden them with unnecessary 
restrictions. Any commissioner worthy of appointment wants to do the best he or 
she can, and wants to do it quickly. These new restrictions, in my view, make it 
difficult to do either. If you start from the premise that inquiries are useless and 
a waste of time and money, then you will welcome these new restrictions. If the 
legislatures adopt this position then the appropriate remedy should be a statutory 
abolition of the public inquiry. The following, however, are the two foundations 
that I believe the law should be based on:
(1) The government has a right to investigate and the public has a right to know 
and these rights are entitled to protection.
(2) An individual being investigated or questioned also has a right to protection, 
but that right is already protected by provisions of the Inquiries Acts and the 
Charter. If those are not enough, the individual can be further protected by 
the commissioner or the judge at trial.
As the law now stands, any effort by provincial or federal governments to 
investigate wrongdoing will have a stormy path through the courts and may well 
be unable to function at all. Certainly, any potential commissioner will be well 
advised to think hard before accepting the appointment. In fact, I would not 
blame any potential commissioner of a proposed provincial inquiry into 
wrongdoing to require a joint federal and provincial appointment, together with 
a reference to the Supreme Court of Canada on the validity of the terms of 
reference and a definition of their scope before commencing the difficult task.
With these statements I have probably precluded myself from ever being asked 
to head another commission, and if there is one thing that the Supreme Court of 
Canada and I can agree upon respecting public inquiries, it is that this is not such 
a bad idea.
